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Spousal Conﬂict and Divorce
Oleksandr Zhylyevskyy, Iowa State University
The optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite
spousal conflict, and allowing for divorce is a subject of policy
debate in the United States. To explore the trade-offs, I construct a
structural model with information asymmetries, which may gener-
ate inefficient outcomes. Parameters are estimated using data from
the National Survey of Families and Households. I find that elim-
inating separation periods decreases the conflict rate by 9.2% of its
baseline level and increases the divorce rate by 4.0%. Perfect child
support enforcement decreases the frequency of conflict and divorce
by 2.7% and 21.2%, respectively, and reduces the incidence of
inefficient divorces.
I. Introduction
Marriage is vital to the production of many economic, social, and health
benefits for individuals, but empirical evidence suggests that spousal con-
flict is sometimes more detrimental to a harmonious family life than di-
vorce. Thus, the optimal balance between keeping marriages intact, despite
intense spousal disputes, and allowing for separation continues to be a
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subject of heated policy debate in the United States, even after years of
changes to divorce laws.1
In this article, I propose and estimate a structural model of marital inter-
actions to explore why some couples have intense disputes but keep living
together, while other couples cooperate, and the rest divorce. The structure
of themodel is used to derive the likelihood contribution of every couple in
the sample. Notably, mymodeling approach offers a number of advantages
over a simpler analytical approach such as reduced-form modeling. In
particular, the structural model proposed here enables a quantification of
the incidence of inefficient divorces. It also allows me to characterize
differences in male and female preferences for marital conflict.
This article fills a void in the family economics literature by proposing a
tractable static model in which marital outcomes are generated in an inter-
nally consistent way, which can be viewed as the first step toward a more
general dynamic model to feature a spectrum of outcomes, with coopera-
tion at one end anddivorce at the other. The article also represents one of the
few attempts in the family economics literature to incorporate in the anal-
ysis spousal self-reports on conflict behaviors, opinions, and beliefs, which
until now have been systematically studied by psychologists and sociolo-
gists only.
In themodel, spouses bargain noncooperatively over the division ofmar-
ital surplus and, depending on the outcome of the negotiations, end up in
one of three distinct states: cooperation (if they reach an agreement on how
to allocate the surplus), conflict (if they stay together after the negotiations
have failed), or divorce (if either the husband or the wife unilaterally
separates). The probability of each marital state is derived using the struc-
ture of the model from inequalities underlying a corresponding Nash
equilibrium in the game. The model allows for asymmetric information
between the spouses along two dimensions. First, every spouse knows the
extent of his or her own utility loss from conflict but is unsure about the
impact of conflict on the partner. Second, the spouses know their own
postdivorce opportunities but are uncertain about the outside options of
each other. This information asymmetry can generate Pareto-inefficient
outcomes, including inefficient conflict and inefficient divorce.2
I estimate structural parameters by the maximum simulated likelihood
method using particularly rich data on almost 3,900 married couples from
the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH). The NSFH
1 Unlike in a paper by Bowlus and Seitz (2006), the primary focus of this research
is on conflicts that do not escalate to physical violence, which is dealtwith by the law
in a separate fashion.
2 In line with Lundberg and Pollak (1993), I assume that the state of conflict is
always an inefficient outcome. However, I allow for both efficient and inefficient
divorces and use the estimated model to quantify the incidence of inefficient
divorces.
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covers a nationally representative probability sample and contains unique
questions that enable construction of indicators of conflict, optimism, or
pessimism about one’s own divorce prospects and beliefs about the part-
ner’s divorce prospects (beliefs about the disutility impact of conflict on
the partner are primarily inferred from observable outcomes). Results of
goodness-of-fit tests indicate that the estimated model fits the data well.
I examine effects of sociodemographic characteristics, marriage market
conditions, and public policy variables on spousal utilities and find that the
estimation results are in line with intuition. For example, the difference
between spousal education levels, which is an indicator of marital heterog-
amy, has a negative impact on marital surplus under cooperation, while
marriage duration has a positive impact. More favorable conditions in the
local marriage market (more specifically, higher availability of potential
marriage partners of the opposite sex) tend to increase the wife’s divorce
payoff. Mandatory separation period requirements tend to reduce spousal
divorce payoffs, but the effect is statistically significant only in the case of
long-term separation periods. Higher child support collection rates reduce
the divorce payoffs of high school educated husbands. In addition, the
estimates suggest thatmarriedwomen tend to derive relatively less disutility
from marital conflict than do men. Also, the results indicate two types of
information asymmetries between the spouses (related to differential effects
of conflict and divorce) and imply that a large majority of married individ-
uals are less able to tolerate conflict and think that their outside options are
low,which contributes to a high observable rate of cooperation inmarriage.
Moreover, the model predicts a substantial incidence of inefficiency con-
ditional on divorce being the equilibrium outcome, which underscores the
impact of asymmetric information on couples’ well-being.
I perform policy experiments to evaluate effects of less stringent separa-
tion period requirements and better enforcement of child support obliga-
tions on the overall distribution of marital outcomes and the incidence of
inefficient divorces. I find that eliminating separation periods can serve as a
deterrent to spousal conflict by decreasing the conflict rate by 9.2% of its
baseline level. Also, it can increase the divorce rate by 4.0% of the baseline
level and increase the probability of the inefficiency in divorce. In compar-
ison, strong enforcement of child support obligations has a potential to
reduce the frequency of both conflict and divorce by as much as 2.7% and
21.2%of their respective baseline rates and also reduce the likelihood of the
inefficiency in divorce. These results suggest that enforcement of child
support obligations is a particularly promising avenue to explore for policy
makers who want to facilitate efficient marital outcomes.
The remainderof this article is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
literature and discusses novel features of the article. Section III describes
the economic model and its main properties. Section IV provides details on
the data and the estimation approach. Section V presents estimation results,
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goodness-of-fit and specification tests, and policy experiments. Section VI
concludes by summarizing key features of the article and briefly outlines
directions for future work. Proofs and technical details are relegated to
appendixes.
II. Contribution to the Literature
The phenomenon of conflict in an intact marriage is empirically relevant.
For instance, in the NSFH data that I use to estimate the model, 23% of
couples report that they have disputes at least several times a week. More-
over, a considerable proportion do not appear to deal with conflict con-
structively: 27% admit that they seldom calmly discuss serious disagree-
ments, and 10% often shout at each other. Still, nearly all economic models
of the household, including traditional (e.g., Becker, Landes, and Michael
1977), cooperative bargaining (e.g., Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and
Horney 1981), and collective models (e.g., Chiappori 1988), consider only
the two polar cases, spousal cooperation versus divorce, while ruling out
any possibilities in between. A small but growing literature on marital
disagreements has addressed such extreme outcomes as spousal homicide,
suicide, and physical abuse (see Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991; Dee 2003;
Bowlus and Seitz 2006; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006) but has tended to
neglect nonviolent disputes.
Conventional models also typically do not allow for inefficient marital
outcomes. However, Udry (1996) shows that a household need not achieve
an efficient allocation of resources across production activities of its mem-
bers, and Duflo and Udry (2004) demonstrate that spouses do not fully
insure each other against short-term variation in individual incomes. This
evidence suggests that the Pareto efficiency of marital outcomes should be
carefully investigated and not simply imposed at the outset since the out-
comes may sometimes be inefficient (see Lundberg and Pollak 1996).
Also, nearly all conventional models rule out asymmetric information
within the marriage. However, available data on spousal opinions and
beliefs indicate that such an asymmetry exists (Friedberg and Stern 2006).
To illustrate, 16% of wives in my estimation sample say that their own
overall happiness would be the same or better after divorce, when the
husbands, on the contrary, believe that thewife’s happinesswould beworse.
Similarly, 18% of husbands report that their own happiness would stay the
same or improve, when the wives, in fact, believe it would worsen. Thus, it
may be desirable to relax a typical assumption of perfect informationwithin
a couple, in line with an original insight of Becker (1991) that some
information asymmetries persist in marriage (see a similar discussion in
Becker et al. 1977).3
3 See alsoPeters (1986) for a description of howprivate information about divorce
payoffs may lead to an inefficient marital outcome.
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This research builds on Lundberg and Pollak’s (1993) idea of an ineffi-
cient noncooperative marital equilibrium and can be also linked to struc-
tural analyses of Tartari (2005), Bowlus and Seitz (2006), and Friedberg and
Stern (2006). However, it differs from these papers and other existing
literature in a number of novel ways.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) adopt the cooperative bargaining frame-
work, but unlike prior papers that use divorce threat points, they specify
spousal outside options in terms of the payoffs from an inefficient equilib-
rium within the marriage. The inefficient equilibrium could result from a
game in which the spouses independently supply and underprovide house-
hold public goods.However, since cooperative bargaining a priori rules out
inefficient equilibriums, Lundberg and Pollak’s model cannot actually
generate noncooperation as an observable outcome. Their model also does
not allow for divorce. In contrast, I specify marital interaction as a nonco-
operative rather than cooperative game. Thus, the model can produce any
one of three potential outcomes—cooperation, conflict, or divorce (some of
which may be Pareto inefficient)—in an internally consistent way.
Tartari (2005) analyzes the relationship between marital status and a
child’s cognitive achievement by specifying that the parental mode of inter-
action, with or without conflict, affects the production of offspring quality.
Spouses can exert costly efforts to increase the likelihood of a conflict-free
relationship, but the actual mode of spousal interaction is randomly drawn
by nature. My approach to endogenizing conflict is different: conflict
indicates a situation in which a couple failed to reach an agreement about
the division of marital surplus but chose not to divorce. Moreover, unlike
Tartari, I allow for asymmetric information between spouses.
Bowlus and Seitz (2006) study responses of wives to physical abuse and
find that women are more likely to divorce violent partners and can
strategically use employment as a deterrent to abuse. Importantly, domestic
violence in their model can only occur if the husband derives a positive
utility premium from abuse. Also, divorce can only happen if the wife
chooses to separate, while the husband cannot initiate divorce on his own.
On the contrary, conflict in my model is associated with a utility loss
relative to cooperation, and both spouses are allowed to unilaterally di-
vorce, which is in line with the divorce legislation in nearly all US states.
Additionally, my article differs from Bowlus and Seitz’s analysis by focus-
ing primarily on nonviolent disputes.
Friedberg and Stern (2006) assume that spouses play a one-stage game in
which the husband offers a side payment to the wife that allocates marital
surplus, whereas the wife can either accept or reject the offer (acceptance
implies cooperation, and rejection results in divorce). The spouses know
their own outside options but may have incorrect beliefs about the divorce
prospects of each other. This information asymmetry leads to a lower
expected match value than the one under perfect information. My model
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is methodologically similar, but it additionally includes conflict as an
outcome of bargaining and incorporates an extra source of information
asymmetry related to the disutility impact of conflict on individuals. More-
over, I parameterize spousal outside options in terms of separation require-
ments and the strength of child support enforcement, which allows me to
investigate effects of public policies involving these two aspects of divorce
regulations.
To a large degree, this article is motivated by a comprehensive analysis of
symptoms of spousal conflict in the psychology literature (see Booth,
Crouter, and Clements 2001; Grych and Fincham 2001). Although few of
the discovered effects in this literature have been plausibly shown to be
causal, there is little doubt that even nonviolent conflicts indicate negative
outcomes for the familywell-being. In particular, marital disagreements are
tied to alcoholism, depression, and various illnesses. In contrast to the route
taken by the psychology literature, my modeling approach allows me to
directly examine the disutility derived by spouses from conflict, rather than
to focus on its many concurrent symptoms (anxiety, depression, etc.).
Unfortunately, the approach does not allow me to separately estimate a
potential direct impact of conflict on children. From theperspective of labor
economics, it may be interesting to knowwhether parental conflict has any
long-term effects on children, for instance, whether it affects their educa-
tional attainment and labor market outcomes. Such research issues are not
the focus of this article andmay be best addressed using amodel in the spirit
of Tartari (2005).
III. Economic Model
A. Setup
The focus of this article is on outcomes that arise in amarriage rather than
on issues such as whymany individuals eventually marry but others choose
to stay single, why some individuals look for a mate for a long time until
they are relatively old but othersmarry at a young age, and howexactlymen
and women sort into marriage, all of which have been studied in the
literature. Thus, to keep analytical complexity at a manageable level, I take
a marriage of two agents, called “husband” and “wife,” as given.4 The hus-
4 Combiningmarital search and spousal bargaining in onemodel is a difficult task,
and I am not aware of any paper that has attempted to endogenize marital match
formation simultaneously with cooperation, conflict, and divorce. Moreover, since
theNSFH does not collect marriage histories from spouses of primary respondents,
such a complex model would be impossible to estimate using the available data. It is
worth noting that in the empirical specification of the model, I will control for a
potential impact of marriage duration (along with other sociodemographic char-
acteristics of a couple) on spousal utilities. Also, I will test for potential dependence
of beliefs on marriage duration.
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band and wife play a two-stage game with a schematic structure given in
figure 1.
One of the spouses, for example, the husband, moves first and (1) pro-
poses cooperation and offers some transfer t to allocate marital surplus or
(2) refuses to cooperate but abstains from separating or (3) announces
divorce. The strategies are respectively denoted as ðt; CÞ, R, and D, and
transfer t represents a transfer of utility between the spouses (the value of t
may be negative). The wife observes her husband’s action and makes her
move. If he chose ðt; CÞ, she (1) accepts the offer or (2) rejects it without
separating or (3) announces divorce. If he picked actionR, she either (1) ab-
stains from separating or (2) announces divorce. If the husband choseD, the
game results in divorce and ends before the wife gets to move. The assump-
tion about the order of the moves is made here since theNSFH contains no
information on the specifics of the actual bargaining protocol. In fact, I
estimate the model twice: first, by specifying that the husband moves first
and, second, by specifying that thewifemoves first. Parameter estimates are
qualitatively similar between these two cases. However, the estimated
model in which the husband moves first has a higher value of the sample
log-likelihood function at the optimum. Hence, it is selected for presenta-
tion in this article.5
FIG. 1.—Structure of marital game
5 Notably, the imposed sequential structure of the game helps to avoid multiplic-
ity of equilibriums that would arise in a setting with simultaneous spousal moves,
complicating identification and estimation. As a more flexible alternative to the
approach in this article, one could potentially consider a model in which nature
chooses the husband to be the first mover with probability p and the wife with
probability 1−p.However, there is no information in theNSFH to credibly identify
this p.
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The game results in one of three mutually exclusive and exhaustive out-
comes, which are referred to as “marital states.” The marital state of
cooperation occurs if the husband makes a transfer offer and the wife
accepts it. The state of conflict happens if either the husband offers a
transfer, but the wife rejects it, or he refuses to cooperate, and she abstains
from separating. The state of divorce is the result of a unilateral decision by a
spouse to terminate the marriage, which is in line with the current divorce
legislation.
All characteristics of a spouse are observable to the partner, except for
two individual traits. First, the spouse may be differentially affected by
conflict. I refer to this trait as “bargaining strength” and, for simplicity,
restrict it to two potential levels. Specifically, the spouse may derive either
(1) a large disutility from conflict (in which case the spouse is said to be a
“soft bargainer”) or (2) a small disutility from conflict (“hard bargainer”).
Second, the spouse may be differentially affected by divorce. This trait is
called “optimism” and, again, is limited to two levels: the spouse anticipates
his or her outside option to be either (1) high (the spouse is an “optimist”)
or (2) low (“pessimist”).6
Spousal type is a combination of the trait levels. There are four possi-
ble types: “hard bargainer–optimist,” “hard bargainer–pessimist,” “soft
bargainer–optimist,” and “soft bargainer–pessimist,” denoted as HO, HP,
SO, and SP, respectively. I index husband’s types by k andwife’s types by l.
Also, I denote the probability that the husband assigns to the event that his
wife’s true type is l by dl, where 0 ≤ dl ≤ 1 for any l, and ∑ ld
l ¼ 1. Thus,
the husband’s beliefs about the wife may be represented by a vector
ðdHO; dHP; dSO; dSPÞ′. The husband’s uncertainty about the wife’s true type
induces asymmetric information in the negotiation process. Notably, the
structure of the game and the specification of the payoffs below imply that
beliefs of the wife about the husband’s type do not affect the outcome of the
game.7
Spouses receive payoffs in the form of utilities that are specific to marital
state, one’s sex, and possibly also one’s own true type but not the partner’s
type. The set of all possible payoff values is commonknowledge. In the state
of cooperation, given transfer t, the husband obtains utility uhð− tÞ, and the
wife receives uwðtÞ, irrespective of their types. The transfer t is used to
6 The notions of “optimism” and “pessimism” are introduced to facilitate the
discussion of player types. They specifically refer to the value of the outside option
and need not be related to one’s tendency to over- or underestimate success in life. A
similar caveat applies to the notion of “bargaining strength,” which is, effectively,
one’s ability to endure conflict that may arise from bargaining in marriage but not
necessarily in conflicts in other contexts.
7 More specifically, the beliefs of the wife about the husband’s true type do not
affect the outcome of the game in which the husband moves first. However, they
would affect the marital outcome if the wife were to move first.
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allocatemarital surplusbetween the spouses.The symbolicminusbefore t in
uhðÞ indicates that the husband is worse off when he makes a higher
transfer to the wife. In reality, marital surplus is “produced” using many
factors such as spousal characteristics andmarital capital. Tokeep themodel
simple, I do not specify a production function of the surplus. However, by
parameterizing the payoffs in terms of characteristics of the couple in the
empirical application, I will effectively estimate how various characteristics
affect the surplus. Functions uhðÞ and uwðÞ are assumed to be continuous
andmonotone in t; namely,uhð− t1Þ < uhð− t2Þ anduwðt1Þ > uwðt2Þ if t1 > t2,
and their domain is a transfer set ½tmin; tmax , where tmin and tmax are (in
absolute value) very large negative and positive numbers, respectively. The
restriction on the domain allows me to rigorously establish several proper-
ties of the game but plays no practical role in the empirical application.
In the state of conflict, no transfer ismade, and the payoff of the husband,
denoted as vkh, and the payoff of the wife, v
l
w, depend on their respective
bargaining strengths. A husbandwho is a hard bargainer–optimist or a hard
bargainer–pessimist receives vHh (i.e., v
HO
h ¼ vHPh ¼ vHh ), and soft bargainers
receive vSh (v
SO
h ¼ vSPh ¼ vSh). The payoffs of the wife are defined analogously.
By definition of the trait of bargaining strength, vSh < v
H
h and v
S
w
< vHw .
Following Lundberg and Pollak (1993), I assume that spousal payoffs in
the state of conflict are below theutility possibility frontier that results from
cooperation. In fact, conflict can reduce marital surplus through several
channels. For example, spouses in conflict may enjoy time spent with each
other by far less than cooperating spouses. Also, spouses in conflict may
underprovide household public goods, which would result in an inefficient
outcome as in Lundberg and Pollak’s setting. In addition, a lower surplus
can result from psychological side effects of conflict (e.g., sadness or
anxiety). Formally, the assumption implies that there exists a transfer
t0 ∈ ½tmin; tmax  such that each spouse would be better off if they cooperated:
uhð− t0Þ > vHh and uwðt0Þ > vHw . In addition, I specify that transfers tmin and
tmax correspond to unbearably large sacrifices of utility on the part of the
wife and the husband, respectively, so that conflict would be preferred:
vSw > uwðtminÞ and vSh > uhð− tmaxÞ.
In the state of divorce, the husband’s utility, denoted as ykh, and the wife’s
utility, ylw, are specific to the trait of optimism. A husband who is a hard
bargainer–optimist or a soft bargainer–optimist receives utility yOh (i.e.,
yHOh ¼ ySOh ¼ yOh ), and pessimists receive yPh ðyHPh ¼ ySPh ¼ yPh Þ. The payoffs of
the wife are defined analogously. By definition of the trait of optimism,
yPh < y
O
h and y
P
w
< yOw . It should be noted that all the payoffs are ex ante
payoffs (i.e., given information at the beginning of the game).
B. Solution
I solve the game by backward induction focusing on equilibriums in pure
strategies. Suppose that the husband proposes cooperation and offers trans-
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fer t. The wife of type l accepts the offer if uwðtÞ ≥ ylw and uwðtÞ ≥ vlw.8 She
rejects it but abstains from separating if vlw ≥ ylw and vlw > uwðtÞ. Finally, she
announces divorce if ylw > vlw and ylw > uwðtÞ. Alternatively, suppose the
husband refuses to cooperate. If vlw ≥ ylw, the wife optimally chooses not to
separate. Otherwise, she is better off by announcing divorce.
Thehusband can anticipate responses of the fourwife’s types to anyof his
actions, but since thewife’s true type is unknown to him, he picks a strategy
by maximizing expected utility. Formally, let the expected utilities of the
husband of type k corresponding to strategies ðt; CÞ, R, and D be re-
spectively denoted as EˆVkhðt; CÞ, EˆVkhðRÞ, and EˆVkhðDÞ, where Eˆ stands for
expectation in terms of his beliefs. Towrite the expected utilities concisely, I
employ indicator functions with vector arguments: 1(condition 1, . . . ,
condition m)′ is one, if conditions 1 through m are all true, and is zero,
otherwise. Specifically, if the husband proposes cooperation and offers
transfer t, his expected utility is
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼∑
l
dl

uhð− tÞ1
uwðtÞ ≥ ylw
uwðtÞ ≥ vlw
 
þ vkh1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
þ ykh1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
:
If he refuses to cooperate, the expected utility is
EˆVkhðRÞ ¼∑
l
dl vkh 1 vlw ≥ ylw
  þ ykh 1 ylw > vlw  	:
If the husband announces divorce, his expected utility is EˆVkhðDÞ ¼ ykh.
Thus, the problem of the husband of type k can be stated as
max
fC;R;Dg
fmaxEˆVkhðt; CÞ; EˆVkhðRÞ; EˆVkhðDÞ
t
g
:
Formally, since the husband has uncountably many transfer choices, the
spousal game is infinite. Moreover, the expected utility of proposing coop-
eration, EˆVkhðt; CÞ, is generally discontinuous in t.9 Therefore, I cannot
apply standard theorems to prove that an equilibrium always exists. How-
ever, it is possible to address the issue of equilibrium existence after a
simplification of the game’s structure.
8 Spousal actions are explicitly specified for equalities to avoid indeterminacy.
9 I refer interested readers to Zhylyevskyy (2008) for graphical illustrations of the
discontinuity and graphical examples of how the spousal game is played out,
depending on specific configurations of the payoffs and the beliefs.
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First, in the following theorem, I show that there is a set of a priori
dominated transfers (all proofs are in app. A).10
THEOREM 1. EˆVkhðt; CÞ ≤ max fEˆVkhðRÞ; EˆVkhðDÞg for all transfers in
set ft : uhð− tÞ < ykhg.
Intuitively, large transfers adversely affect the husband, and he should never
offer them since better options are available. Thus, I define the set of a priori
undominated transfers as Tk ¼ ft : uhð− tÞ ≥ ykh; tmin ≤ t ≤ tmax g and will
analyze transfers from Tk only.
Second, it is possible to establish an important property of function
EˆVkhðt; CÞ.
THEOREM 2. EˆVkhðt; CÞ is upper semicontinuous on Tk.
The property is important because whenever the set Tk is nonempty,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ attains its maximum on it (Jost 2003, lemma 12.6), and therefore,
maxt ∈ TkEˆVkhðt; CÞ is well defined.
Third, I prove a dominance result for the husband’s strategies.
THEOREM 3. For any k, (1) if Tk is empty, then EˆVkhðDÞ ≥ EˆVkhðRÞ,
and (2) if Tk is not empty, then maxt ∈ TkEˆVkhðt; CÞ ≥ EˆVkhðRÞ.
The theorem shows that if the outside option of the husband is so high that
all transfers are a priori dominated, and thus Tk is empty, there is no reason
for him to stay married in the first place. Otherwise, the husband need not
consider inciting a conflict on his own as he could, in fact, do better by
offering some transfer from Tk. Hence, the game can be simplified by
eliminating husband’s strategyR.
Finally, I establish the existence of an equilibrium.
THEOREM 4. An equilibrium of the game always exists.
C. Role of Asymmetric Information
To investigate the role of asymmetric information in generating the state
of conflict, I consider an alternativemodel inwhich individuals have private
information about divorce prospects but, unlike in the original model,
perfectly observe the bargaining strength of their partners. Since the bar-
gaining strength of the partner is now common knowledge, the alternative
model is a special case of the original one with just two player types—
optimist (O) and pessimist (P)—and, for notational convenience, I can drop
the type superscripts on spousal payoffs from conflict.
I show that the alternative model has an important property.
10 To avoid ambiguity, it should be noted that the following theorems do not
impose any auxiliary assumptions on the game. They only show that a simplification
of the game structure is possible on the basis of the previously stated assumptions.
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THEOREM 5. The alternative model cannot generate the state of
conflict if at least one of the following three conditions holds: (1)
ylw > vw for all l, (2) husband’s beliefs are such that d
P > 0, or (3)ylw ≤ vw
for all l.
It follows that the state of conflict can now happen only if restrictions
yPw ≤ vw < yOw and d
P ¼ 0 are simultaneously true. The latter restriction,
dP ¼ 0, is particularly problematic. First, it implies that husbands in all
conflicting couples have identical degenerate beliefs about their wives.
Second, since the vector of beliefs is parameterized in the empirical appli-
cation as having continuous support, the likelihood contribution of any
conflicting couple would always be zero. Hence, the alternative model
cannot plausibly explain the data on marital outcomes.
IV. Data and Estimation Approach
A. National Survey of Families and Households
The main data source for the empirical analysis is the NSFH, which
provides a broad range of information on family life in theUnited States (see
Sweet, Bumpass, and Call 1988). The NSFH covers a nationally represen-
tative probability sample with oversampling of minority groups. Married
couples comprise a subsample of the survey, and a set of samplingweights is
separately available for them.
TheNSFHcollects rich data that are particularly suitable to the empirical
analysis. Specifically, I observe spousal reports on the frequency of dis-
agreements and on the process of dispute resolution. I also get information
on a spouse’s postmarital prospects and beliefs about the partner’s well-
being after hypothetical divorce. Moreover, I observe a range of socio-
demographic characteristics, and the NSFH staff merged individual data
with state- and county-level information that is described later.
The NSFH is a panel with three completed waves of data collection, the
first two of which are used to estimate the model.Wave 1 was conducted in
1987–88 and includes 13,007 households, of which 10,005 were resurveyed
duringwave 2 in 1992–94 (more than half of the respondents are single). The
average time interval between the first and the second interviews is approx-
imately 5.5 years. Due to financial constraints, wave 3 (2001–2) was com-
pleted for a smaller selected subsample of families, and since these data may
be nonrandom, I do not use them in the estimation.
In total, the estimation sample consists of 3,878 couples and is con-
structed as follows. I take all 5,270 married couples who participated in the
first data collection wave. From these, I exclude 575 couples with missing
data, 477 couples that were not reinterviewed during the second wave for
reasons other than death, and 340 couples in which a spouse died between
the first and the second waves.
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Aseparate analysis of sample attrition shows that the above exclusions do
not introduce any considerable distortion with respect to observable socio-
demographic characteristics.As expected, spouses in coupleswith a respon-
dent’s death are relatively old. Spouses in couples that were not reinter-
viewedduringwave 2 (for reasonsother thandeath) tend tobe less educated.
Hispanics appear to drop from the sample at a higher rate than whites or
blacks.11 Also, themajority of noninterview cases occurred because a couple
refused to participate in wave 2 rather than because spouses moved and the
NSFH subsequently failed to locate them. In addition, I compared the
estimation sample to the corresponding population group using the 5%
Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for the 1990 census (Bureau of the
Census 1995). Discrepancies between characteristics of the sample and the
population tend to be small.12
B. Marital State
The marital state of a couple—cooperation, conflict, or divorce—is the
outcome variable to be explained and is determined on the basis of the
second NSFH interview (1992–94). A couple is in the state of divorce if
spouses, who were married during wave 1, are reported as “divorced” or
“separated due to marital problem” in the wave 2 status file. I follow many
papers in the family economics literature by treating separated couples
identically to the divorced ones. In the United States, divorcing couples
often go through a lengthy legal process before a court issues a final divorce
decree. Thus, many couples who report being separated (but not yet
divorced) in wave 2 may, in fact, be already on the path to formal divorce.
To further explore the issue of whether it is reasonable to assign the state of
divorce to separated couples, I perform an additional data analysis using the
NSFHmarriage history file compiled after wave 3. The file indicates a total
of 2,715 instances of marital separation over the lifetime of all wave 3 re-
spondents (note that only a fraction of the wave 2 respondents were re-
interviewed in wave 3). Of these, 2,594 separations (i.e., 96%) eventually
resulted in divorce. Although this finding is only suggestive of the eventual
fate of separations reported in wave 2, it supports my approach.13
The task of assigning conflict to an intact couple is more challenging. The
psychology literature distinguishes between “constructive” and “destruc-
tive” disagreements. Constructive disagreements involve disputes that are
not intense and are quickly resolved. Destructive disagreements are the
11 MaCurdy,Mroz, andGritz (1998) report a similar finding forHispanics in their
analysis of attrition in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979.
12 Details on the analysis of the sample attrition and comparison of the estimation
sample to the US population can be found in Zhylyevskyy (2008).
13 Also, it should be noted that separated spouses are not asked questions used in
this article to determine the state of conflict.
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opposite: they happen with high frequency and are not easily and quickly
settled (Grych and Fincham 2001).
In the model, the state of conflict refers to a situation in which a couple
engages in destructive and, hence, inefficient disagreements. I identify such
instances using questions about frequencies of disputes and the process of
conflict resolution. Specifically, all husbands and wives are asked: “The
following is a list of subjects on which couples often have disagreements.
Howoften, if at all, in the past year have you had open disagreements about
each of the following: household tasks, money, spending time together, sex,
in-laws, the children?” The response categories range from “never” to
“almost every day.” To mitigate a potential problem of underreporting, I
infer the frequency of disagreements as the maximum of the corresponding
husband’s and wife’s frequencies. Also, spouses report how they deal with
disputes: “There are various ways that married couples deal with serious
disagreements. When you have a serious disagreement with your husband/
wife, how often do you: discuss your disagreements calmly, argue heatedly
or shout at each other?” Possible responses in each case range from “never”
to “always.” I assign the state of conflict to an intact couple if the following
conditions aremet. First, the spousesmust disagree about at least one aspect
of their relationship several times a week ormore often. Second, at least one
spouse must admit that they seldom or never calmly discuss disagreements
or often or always heatedly argue with each other.14 The remaining intact
couples are in the state of cooperation. The distribution of the marital state
variable in the estimation sample is given in table 1; 79% of couples are in
14 The state of conflict is treated as an equilibriumoutcome rather than as a purely
transitory state on the road from marital cooperation to divorce, in which case one
would expect all couples in conflict to eventually divorce. To explore this issue, I use
theNSFHmarriage history file, which contains information on the status as ofwave
3 of 202 couples who were in conflict in wave 2 (note that only a subsample of
respondentswere reinterviewed inwave 3).Of these, only 24 couples have divorced.
Although this evidence is only suggestive since the information on the status of
many couples is not available, it appears to provide relatively little support for
treating conflict as a purely transitory state followed by divorce.
Table 1
Distribution of Marital State Variable
Marital State Observed Frequency Weighted Fraction (%)
Cooperation 2,948 78.65
Conflict 416 10.27
Divorce 514 11.08
Total 3,878 100.00
NOTE.—Weighted fractions are calculated using the National Survey of Families and Households
(NSFH) sample weights. Marital state is determined on the basis of the NSFH wave 2 interview.
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the state of cooperation, 10% are in the state of conflict, and 11% are in
the state of divorce.
C. Explanatory Variables
For convenience, explanatory variables are grouped into three categories:
(1) opinions and beliefs, (2) individual characteristics, and (3) location-
specific information. All of them pertain to the time of the NSFH wave 1
(in contrast, the outcome variable, marital state, is determined using data
fromwave 2). The first category, opinions and beliefs, consists of individual
responses thatmayprovide some information about spouses’ own types and
about beliefs regarding the partner’s type. In particular, everyone is asked:
“Even though it may be very unlikely, think for a moment about how
various areas of your life might be different if you separated. For each of the
following areas, how do you think things would change?” I focus on the
question about overall happiness after a hypothetical separation,whichmay
be informative about the trait of optimism, and create two indicator vari-
ables: for spouses who report that their happiness after separation would
stay the same and for those who report that it would be better or much
better. The base category includes spouses who report that their happiness
would be worse or muchworse. It is important to note that in the empirical
application, I take a flexible approach by inferring the true types probabi-
listically using the created indicator variables. Thus, my suggested inter-
pretation of what the responses might actually mean does not drive the
estimation.
Spouses are asked analogous questions about hypothetical divorce op-
portunities of their partners, which may be informative about their beliefs
regarding the partner’s type. I create an indicator for husbands who believe
that the overall happiness of their wives would be the same and an indicator
for husbands who believe it would be better or much better (these two
indicators are used to infer the husband’s beliefs rather than player types).
In addition, everyone reports whether they agree or disagree with the
following statement: “I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal
plane with others.” The responses are not easy to interpret (e.g., they may
reveal individuals who are more likely to just divorce when the transfer is
not enough to keep them in the cooperation state), but I believe theymay be
informative about spousal types. In particular, individualswho strongly feel
they are on an equal plane with others may be the ones who are more eager
to defend their own point of view in disputes and, thus, indicate a higher
tolerance of enduring conflict in comparison to individuals who have a low
opinion of their own worthiness. Hence, I create an indicator for spouses
who express strong agreement and use it together with other indicator
variables to infer spousal types. It may be helpful to note that observable
frequencies of marital states vary with the responses in line with my
interpretation. Among couples in which no spouse expresses strong agree-
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ment with the statement, the fraction of those who are in cooperation,
conflict, and divorce is 79.84%, 7.50%, and 12.66%, respectively. In com-
parison, among couples in which at least one spouse expresses strong
agreement, the corresponding fractions are 78.34%, 11.09%, and 10.57%,
indicating a higher incidence of conflict. Summary statistics for the indi-
cator variables related to spousal types and beliefs are given in table B1
(app. B). Interestingly, 23% of husbands and 22% of wives say their
happiness would stay the same or improve after a hypothetical divorce.
The group of individual characteristics that are used tomodel the payoffs
in the game comprises standard sociodemographic data such as age, race,
religious affiliation, and education, all of which are measured as of the
NSFH wave 1. I group reported religious beliefs in accordance with a
classification of Melton (1977) and create indicators for the husband’s
affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church and the difference in the
spousal religious affiliations. Other differences in spousal characteristics
such as between spousal ages and educational attainments are also included.
Education categories represent the highest completed level of schooling (the
base category is “no high school degree”). In addition, I control for the
duration of marriage (measured as of wave 1) and the number of own
children of the wife (i.e., the husband’s stepchildren), if any.15 Summary
statistics are presented in table B2.
Two remarks about the included sociodemographic characteristics are in
order. First, I make an effort to control for characteristics that are unlikely
to be endogenous with respect to bargaining in marriage. In contrast,
characteristics that are sometimes found in the literature to be divorce
predictors but likely to be endogenous—such as the number of common
children of the spouses, home ownership, employment, and income—are
not included in the estimation. However, I control for the number of the
wife’s own children since it is her predetermined characteristic and not an
outcome of fertility decisions within the current marriage.
Second, given the features of the available data and the static nature of the
model, it is important to account for marriage duration, which may help to
mitigate the initial conditions problempotentially present in the analysis. In
particular, I use in the estimation a cross-section of married couples at
different stages of the life cycle. Thus, it is possible that the couples in the
analysis systematically differ with respect to unobservable characteristics.
More specifically, couples with longer marriage durations may have larger
stocks of unobservable marital capital, which can significantly affect the
production of marital surplus and family decision making. To control for
such potential effects, I include marriage duration among the determinants
of the payoffs. In fact, estimation results presented in SectionV indicate that
marriage duration has a strong positive impact on the payoff from cooper-
15 The number of couples with the wife’s stepchildren is negligible.
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ation. In addition, it is conceivable that marriage duration affects beliefs
because marriages that have lasted longer are dynamically selected on the
basis of the individual traits of optimism and bargaining strength. In that
case, duration should also be incorporated in the specification of the type
probability functions in the belief vector. However, one of the Lagrange
multiplier tests reported in Section V.E indicates that coefficients on mar-
riage duration in these functions are not statistically different from zero.
Therefore, I estimate and present results for a model that does not incor-
porate marriage duration in beliefs. It is worth noting that the empirical
specification of themodel includes all available spousal responses regarding
individual traits. Thus, the test result simply suggests thatmarriage duration
has no statistically significant additional impact on the estimated beliefs
after the responses have been accounted for.
Explanatory variables related to geographical location include proxies for
local marriage market conditions, as well as some specifics of the divorce
legislation and enforcement of child support obligations at the state level
(see table B3 for summary statistics). These variables can affect spousal
outside options (McElroy 1990), and therefore, I use them to model the
divorce payoffs but not the payoffs from cooperation or conflict. It should
be noted that the exclusion of these variables from the specification of the
utilities of remaining married can be rationalized in the context of any
“generic” model of marriage rather than only in the case of the specific
game theoretic model proposed in this article. Also, in the context of my
model, these variables can have an indirect effect on the division of marital
surplus because a change in the outside options can shift bargaining power
from one spouse to the other.
Local marriage market conditions influence the ease of finding a new
mate after divorce.As is common in the literature, I approximate themusing
the availability ratio, which is the ratio of the number of marriageable indi-
viduals of one sex to the size of a corresponding group of the opposite sex
(Goldman, Westoff, and Hammerslough 1984; Fossett and Kiecolt 1991).
The availability ratio is a refined version of the concept of sex ratio. The
ratios are computed at a county level on the basis of the 1990 5%PUMS and
are specific to race, sex, age, and education.16
Divorce statutes inmany states provide formandatory separationperiods
before divorce (Freed andWalker 1991; Friedberg 1998),which can increase
divorce costs of separating couples (other divorce legislation focuses pri-
marily on allocating property and child custody rights). Formally, a sepa-
ration period is the requirement for spouses to live apart without cohabi-
tation for a specified period of time before a court can issue a final divorce
decree. The shortest period across states that have separation requirements
16 Zhylyevskyy (2008) discusses in detail the methodology of computing avail-
ability ratios, including the actual formulas.
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is 6 months. Since the impact of a period may vary with its length, I create
two indicator variables: for individuals who live in a state with a separation
periodbetween 6months and 1 year (18%of the sample) and for individuals
in a state with a period lasting more than a year (33%). The base category
comprises individuals who live in states with no separation requirements.
Divorce payoffs can also depend on how well court-ordered child sup-
port payments are enforced since some noncustodial parents (usually,
fathers) would abstain from transferring resources to custodial parents if
the probability of being punished for violating the support order were low
(Weiss andWillis 1985). In fact, the variation in the strength of child support
enforcement (CSE) across states has received considerable attention at the
national level (US House Committee on Ways and Means 1991). To ap-
proximate the strength of the enforcement in a particular state, I use theCSE
collection rate reported by the state enforcement agency (Nixon 1997).
More specifically, I average annual CSE collection rates from 1987 to 1994
and assign the result to coupleswith children (childless couples are assigned
the value of zero).
D. Parameterization
The payoffs of every player type are common knowledge in the game.
However, the econometrician does not observe many factors known to the
spouses that may affect their utilities such as love and physical attractive-
ness. Therefore, the parameterized payoffs can have both deterministic and
stochastic components in the empirical application. Let vector x include the
individual characteristics as of the NSFH wave 1 related to age, race,
religion, and so on (see Sec. IV.C for a discussion), and a constant term.
The payoffs of the husband and the wife in the state of cooperation are
specified as uhð− tÞ ¼ x′ah − t þ v1 and uwðtÞ ¼ x′aw þ t þ v3, respectively,
where ah and aw are the coefficients and v1 and v3 are error terms. As
explained in Section IV.F, I can only identify the sum of the coefficients,
a ¼ ah þ aw, which measures the impact of the characteristics on the joint
surplus under cooperation.
In the state of conflict, the payoffs depend on a player’s trait of bargain-
ing strength. The utilities of soft bargainers are vSh ¼ x′bh þ v2 and vSw ¼
x′bw þ v4, respectively, where bh and bw represent the coefficients, and v2
and v4 are error terms. Since hard bargainers must be better off than soft
bargainers, I specify that their payoffs differ by a positive constant: vHh ¼
vSh þ bHh and vHw ¼ vSw þ bHw , where bHh > 0 and bHw > 0 are the constants to
estimate. In contrast to the utilities from cooperation, the payoffs from
conflict to the husband and the wife are separately identifiable (see Sec. IV.F).
The vector representing the payoff error terms, v, is assumed to be inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across couples as a normal
random vector, v ∼ i.i.d. Nð0;∑Þ, where ∑ is the covariance matrix.
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For identification reasons (see Sec. IV.F), vector x cannot be used to also
parameterize the divorce payoffs. Instead, I employ location-specific vari-
ables (table B3). Let vector zh consist of the male-specific availability ratio,
indicators for legal separation periods, and the collection rate and its inter-
actionswith the husband’s education.Vector zw contains the samevariables,
with some specific to the wife (e.g., the female-specific availability ratio).
The interaction terms help to account for potentially varying effects of the
CSEacrosswealth groups,with education proxying forwealth after divorce
(I choose not to use observable income because of its potential endogeneity
with respect to spousal decisions in marriage). By parameterizing the di-
vorce payoffs with vectors zh and zw, I implicitly assume that the location-
specific variables are exogenous in the sense that they do not affect the
distribution of the unobservable payoff error vector v and do not provide
additional information about spousal types and beliefs (on top of the cor-
responding individual responses in the survey). Also, the payoffs in the state
of divorce depend on the personal trait of optimism. Thus, I specify the
utilities of the pessimistic husband and wife as yPh ¼ z′hgh and yPw ¼ z′wgw,
respectively, where gh and gw are the coefficients. Since optimistsmust be ex
ante better off thanpessimists, I assume that their payoffs differ by a positive
constant: yOh ¼ yPh þ gOh and yOw ¼ yPw þ gOw , where gOh > 0 and gOw > 0 are the
constants to estimate.
Every player in the game knows his or her own true type (but not the
partner’s type). However, the econometrician only observes discrete an-
swers about divorce prospects and selected opinions. Therefore, I choose to
infer the spousal types probabilistically by extending an approach proposed
by Degan and Merlo (2006). Let vector ah include a constant term and the
following three indicators: if the husband thinks his overall happiness
would be the same after divorce, if he thinks it would be better or much
better, and if he strongly agrees that he is a person of worth (table B1). Let
vector aw contain analogous variables for thewife. I specify that the husband
is of type k and the wife is of type l with probabilities
pkh ¼
exp ða′hlkhÞ
∑ jexp ða′hljhÞ
and plw ¼
exp ða′wllwÞ
∑ jexp ða′wljwÞ
;
where lkh and l
l
w for k; l ≠ SP represent the coefficients, and l
SP
h ¼ lSPw ¼ 0 by
normalization. The chosen form is convenient because it restricts the values
of the type probabilities to a unit simplex.
Finally, the husband knows his own beliefs in the game, but the econo-
metrician only observes discrete answers of the husband about hypothetical
divorce opportunities of the wife. Hence, I specify that the belief vector
ðdHO; dHP; dSO; dSPÞ′ is randomly distributed on a unit simplex. Let vector b
include a constant term and the following two indicators: if the husband
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believes his wife’s overall happiness would be the same after divorce and if
he believes it would be better or much better (table B1). I parameterize the
probability that the husband assigns to the event that his wife’s type is l as
dl ¼ exp ðb
′rl þ hlÞ
∑ jexp ðb′rj þ hjÞ
;
whererl for l ≠ SP stands for the vector of coefficients,hl for l ≠ SP is an error
term, and rSP ¼ 0 and hSP ¼ 0 by normalization. The vector representing the
belief error terms, h, accounts for the information the husband has about his
wife’s type that he does not reveal in the NSFH interview (e.g., what he
knows about her trait of bargaining strength). I assume that h is i.i.d. across
couples as a normal random vector, h ∼ i.i.d.Nð0;QÞ, where Q is the covari-
ance matrix.
E. Estimation Strategy
All parameters of the empirical model are estimated simultaneously by
the maximum simulated likelihood method. The structure of the model is
exploited in the estimation procedure to derive the likelihood contribution
of every couple.
The likelihood contribution of a couple in a marital state s (cooperation,
conflict, or divorce) is the probability that the state s is an equilibrium
outcome of the game. Since the three marital states are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive, it suffices to find the probabilities of only two of them,
namely, s= cooperation and s= conflict. LetX represent all available data for
a couple,X ¼ ðx; zh; zw; ah; aw; bÞ, and let G represent all model parameters,
G ¼ ða; bh; bHh ; bw; bHw ; gh; gOh ; gw; gOw ; fljh; ljw; r jgj ≠ SP;∑ ;QÞ. The first step is
to express the probabilities of the states of cooperation and conflict in terms
of corresponding conditional probabilities given spousal types:
Pr ½s ¼ cooperationjX;G ¼∑
k;l
pkhplwPr ½s ¼ cooperationjk; l;X; G;
ð1Þ
Pr ½s ¼ conflictjX;G ¼∑
k;l
pkhplwPr ½s ¼ conflictjk; l;X; G; ð2Þ
where pkh ¼ exp ða′hlkhÞ=∑ jexp ða′hljhÞ and plw ¼ exp ða′wllwÞ=∑ jexp ða′wljwÞ, as
defined earlier. To obtain equations (1) and (2), I implicitly assume that the
husband’s responses about his overall happiness after a hypothetical divorce
and his being a person of worth are informative about the husband’s true
type but provide no information about the wife’s type in addition to the
information already contained in thewife’s responses (and vice versa for the
wife’s responses). Thus, the probability of a husband-wife type pair ðk; lÞ is
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specified as the product of pkh and p
l
w. This specification is conditional on
spousal responses and does not preclude an “intracouple” correlation of
spousal types in the unconditional distribution of true types in the popu-
lation of married individuals since the responses of the husband may be
correlated with the responses of the wife.
The second step in deriving the likelihood contribution is to employ the
theoretical results from Section III to specify restrictions under which
cooperation and conflict are equilibrium outcomes of the game, conditional
on the player types, and then compute the probability measure of the set of
the error terms v and h on which the restrictions hold. Consider the state of
cooperation,which occurs if the husbandoffers an acceptable transfer to the
wife:
Pr ½s ¼ cooperationjk; l;X; G
¼ Ev;h
h
1ft* ¼ arg max
t ∈ Tkðv;X;GÞ
EˆVkhðt; C; v; h;X;GÞ; EˆVkhðt*; C; v; h;X;GÞ
≥ ykhðX;GÞ; uwðt*; v;X;GÞ
≥ vlwðv;X;GÞ; uwðt*; v;X;GÞ ≥ ylwðX;GÞg′
i
;
ð3Þ
where Ev;h½  denotes expectation under the joint probability measure of v
and h.
The first and second conditions in the indicator function in equation (3)
mean that for the husband of type k, transfer t* maximizes his expected
utility of cooperating, and the husband decides to offer t* rather than to
announce divorce. The third and fourth conditionsmean that the utility that
the wife of type l gets from accepting t* is at least as high as the utility from
rejecting the offer or announcing divorce. Thus, it is optimal for her to
accept this t*. The expected value of the indicator function is the conditional
probability of cooperation given the spousal types k and l.
The conditional probability of the state of conflict is obtained analo-
gously. This state occurs if the husband offers a transfer but the wife
rejects it without announcing divorce:
Pr ½s ¼ conflictjk; l;X; G
¼ Ev;h
h
1ft* ¼ arg max
t ∈ Tkðv;X;GÞ
EˆVkhðt; C; v; h;X;GÞ;EˆVkhðt*; C; v; h;X;GÞ
≥ ykhðX;GÞ; vlwðv;X;GÞ
> uwðt*; v; x;GÞ; vlwðv;X;GÞ ≥ ylwðX;GÞg′
i
;
ð4Þ
where the third and fourth conditions in the indicator function now imply
that the wife of type l decides to reject t* but abstains from announcing
divorce.
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To implement equations (3) and (4) in estimation, I devise an algorithm to
transform the conditional expected values of the indicator functions so that
they can be computed by the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) simu-
lationmethod, which is known to have good numerical properties (Bo¨rsch-
Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993; Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud 1996).
The algorithm exploits the structure of the model and is presented in
appendix C. Once the conditional probabilities have been evaluated by
simulation for all possible combinations of spousal types, I calculate the
likelihood contribution of a couple in the state of cooperation using equa-
tion (1) anda couple in the stateof conflict using equation (2).The likelihood
contribution of a couple in the state of divorce is calculated as Pr ½s ¼
divorcejX;G ¼ 1−Pr ½s ¼ cooperationjX;G−Pr ½s ¼ conflictjX;G.
F. Identification
To identify the parameters of the model, I exploit cross-sectional covari-
ation of the explanatory variables with marital states. The variation in
sociodemographic characteristics helps to identify the coefficients in the
cooperation and conflict payoffs, if some characteristics (e.g., shorter mar-
riage duration) are observed more commonly among couples in conflict
than in cooperation. The variation in the location-specific variables helps to
identify parameters in the divorce utilities, if some characteristics (e.g., long-
term separation periods) are correlated with a lower incidence of divorce,
for example. Differential responses of spouses about their happiness after a
hypothetical divorce and about being a person of worth help to identify the
coefficients in the type probability functions. Differential responses of
husbands about hypothetical postdivorce happiness of their wives are
helpful in the identification of the parameters in the belief functions.
A few important remarks about the identification of the payoffs are in
order. Notably, the identification of the utility parameters is affected by the
assumption of transferable spousal utilities under cooperation and non-
transferable utilities in conflict and divorce. In particular, I cannot sepa-
rately estimate coefficients ah and aw in the specification of the cooperation
utilities uhð− tÞ and uwðtÞ. Instead, I can only identify their sum, a ¼
ah þ aw, which represents the impact of the vector of individual character-
istics x on the joint spousal value of the cooperative marriage relative to
divorce. In fact, since the spousal cooperation utilities are transferable, the
outcome of the game depends on the position of the entire utility possibility
frontier that results from cooperation rather than on uhð− tÞ and uwðtÞ
separately. Also, since these utilities are linear in the transfer, the position
of the frontier depends only on their sum. In other words, supposing that
the husband’s utility from cooperation is plotted on the horizontal axis and
the wife’s utility is on the vertical axis, if the husband’s utility rises, the
frontier shifts to the right, but this change is observationally equivalent to an
upward shift of the frontier due to an increase in the wife’s utility. The
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specificmathematical reason for the identification limitation here is that the
integration bounds in the computation of the likelihood contribution (see
Sec. IV.E and app. C) depend on x′ðah þ awÞ, rather than on x′ah and x′aw
separately. In contrast, I am able to separately identify the utilities of the
husband and the wife from conflict and divorce. These utilities are non-
transferable between the spouses, and the effect of the husband’s utility on
the outcome of the game in this case can be distinguished from the effect of
the wife’s utility.
Next, recall that the vector of individual characteristics x is included in the
specification of the cooperation and conflict payoffs. If xwere additionally
included in the specification of the divorce payoffs, the corresponding
effects could not be simultaneously estimated. The underlying reason is
that an equilibrium of the game is invariant with respect to a positive affine
transformation of the payoffs, and consequently, the spousal utility levels
are not identifiable. Thus, I choose to exclude x from the specification of the
divorce payoffs. This exclusion does not mean that spousal characteristics x
are irrelevant after separation, but rather it implies that the estimated effect
of x in the states of cooperation and conflict must be interpreted as being
relative to the impact of x in the state of divorce. Another implication of the
invariance is that I cannot identify the utility scale. Therefore, when esti-
mating the model, I normalize corresponding diagonal elements of the
covariance matrix ∑ to 1.
Structural errors h (reflecting the discreteness of the reported husbands’
beliefs) and v (reflecting unobserved factors that influence the payoffs) are
identified via the occurrence of marital states that cannot be otherwise
explained using the observable data. The model implies that if, for two
coupleswith identical values of spousal payoffs, one ended up in the state of
cooperation and the other in the state of conflict, it must be that the
husbands held different beliefs. The model also implies that if, for two
couples with identical observable characteristics and belief vectors, one
ended up in the state of cooperation and the other in the state of divorce,
it must be that the couples differed in their stochastic utility components.
V. Results
A. Payoff Parameters
Table 2 shows estimates of the utility parameters that indicate by how
much individual characteristics contribute to the joint value of cooperative
marriage relative to their impact on the divorce payoffs. I detect positive
utility effects of the husband’s age, of the husband being black andCatholic,
and of marriage duration. The latter utility effect may be indicative of a
positive impact of the stock of marital capital on the production of marital
surplus under cooperation. In turn, the indicators of marital heterogamy
(i.e., the difference between characteristics of the husband and thewife) tend
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to have a negative effect on the joint payoff. For example, if spouses have
different education, it lowers the payoff. The result suggests that there may
be positive complementarities between spousal characteristics in the pro-
duction of marital surplus. Perhaps when spouses have similar education,
they are more likely to share interests and value time spent with each other
bymore than spouses with different education. Conversely, heterogeneous
couples may be less efficient in the production of the surplus. In line with
this interpretation, I find a negative utility impact of the difference in
religious affiliations, but it is not precisely estimated. In addition, I find
that awife’s own child (i.e., the husband’s stepchild) lowers the joint payoff,
which suggests that stepchildren may have a negative effect on the produc-
tion of marital surplus.
Table 3 lists coefficients that determine by howmuch spousal character-
istics contribute to payoffs from conflict relative to divorce. Unlike in the
state of cooperation, the husband’s payoff and the wife’s payoff are now
separately identifiable. I find sizable utility premia associatedwith the one’s
ability to endure marital conflict (i.e., the premia from being a hard bar-
gainer), and the utility premium effect appears to be particularly strong in
the wife’s case. The husband’s age, race, and college education are estimated
to have opposite effects on the spousal payoffs from conflict. More specif-
ically, I find that an increase in the husband’s age raises his utility but lowers
thewife’s utility.At the same time, an increase in the age difference between
the spouses lowers the husband’s payoff but raises the wife’s payoff. If the
husband is black, it appears to decrease his utility but increase the wife’s
utility. If the husband has a college degree, it increases his payoff but
decreases the wife’s payoff. To explain these results, it is important to recall
Table 2
Utility Parameters in State of Cooperation
Variable Coefficient SE
Constant 5.602** .815
Age, husband’sa .025** .012
Age, absolute differencea .007 .022
Black husband .576** .227
Catholic husband .318** .153
Religion, difference −.035 .135
High school, husbandb .176 .233
College, husbandb .072 .279
Education, difference −.308** .131
Marriage durationa .080** .017
Wife’s children −.296** .091
NOTE.—Coefficients denote the effect of variables on the sumof spousal utilities
in the state of cooperation relative to the impact in the state of divorce. The value of
the sample log-likelihood function is −2,410.603.
a Variable is standardized in estimation. I report the impact of a 1-year increase.
b The omitted education category is “no high school degree.”
** p < :05.
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that the utility effect of every variable in the state of conflict is estimated
relative to its impact in the state of divorce. Thus, the estimated positive
effects of age and college education on the husband in conflictmaybe due to
a large disutility from divorce among husbands who are older and more
educated (perhaps such husbands expect to be ordered by the court tomake
large wealth transfers to the ex-wives after divorce). Conversely, these
husband’s characteristics may positively affect the wife’s utility from di-
vorce, which would explain why they are estimated to have a negative
impact on the wife in conflict. The estimated differential effects in the state
of conflict of the age difference and of the husband being black may also be
due to differential effects of these characteristics on the payoffs from
divorce. In addition, I find that the husband beingCatholic raises the payoff
from conflict for both spouses. This result may be indicative of higher
tolerance of conflict or larger separation costs among Catholics given that
the Roman Catholic Church strongly opposes divorce. The estimated
negative effect of the difference in religious affiliations on the husband’s
utilitymay be due to a higher intensity of conflicts between spouses who do
not share each other’s faith (perhaps they are less likely to use support of
religious community to resolve conflicts). Finally, I find that presence of the
wife’s children increases the spousal payoffs from conflict. Perhaps conflicts
in couples with stepchildren are less intense, which would explain the
positive coefficients.
Interestingly, the estimates indicate differences in male and female pref-
erences for conflict. To facilitate the discussion here, I use the term “util,”
which is defined as 1 standard deviation of the error that represents a
Table 3
Utility Parameters in State of Conﬂict
Husband Wife
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Constant −2.991** .744 −.873 .558
Hard bargainer’s premium 2.528** .475 4.332** .006
Age, husband’sa .101** .014 −.036** .011
Age, absolute differencea −.201** .027 .087** .023
Black husband −1.281** .517 .816** .218
Catholic husband .864** .182 .276** .136
Religion, difference −1.002** .187 .155 .140
High school, husbandb −.157 .312 −.302 .188
College, husbandb .725** .346 −1.009** .214
Education, difference −.137 .174 .141 .130
Marriage durationa −.015 .021 −.002 .011
Wife’s children .334** .118 .319** .136
NOTE.—Coefficients denote the effect of variables on spousal utilities in the state of conflict relative to
the impact in the state of divorce.
a Variable is standardized in estimation. I report the impact of a 1-year increase.
b The omitted education category is “no high school degree.”
** p < :05.
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stochastic utility component (this definition is motivated by a normaliza-
tion in the covariance matrix ∑ ). Also, I employ the NSFH sample weights
so that the reported results are representative of the US population of
married individuals. Using the obtained payoff parameters and estimates
of individual type probabilities (see more on the type probabilities in the
following subsection), I compute that husbands would on average derive
−2.144 utils from conflict, while wives would on average derive −0.157 utils
(note that some spouses can derive positive utility from conflict, depending
on their sociodemographic characteristics). Thus, the estimates indicate that
marriedwomen tend to derive relatively less disutility from conflict than do
men. The difference between the male and the female preferences is also
evident when considering type-specific payoffs. In particular, if everyone
were a hard bargainer, husbands would on average derive −0.223 utils from
conflict, while wives would derive 3.089 utils. In turn, if everyone were a
soft bargainer, husbands would on average derive −2.751 utils, while wives
would derive −1.243 utils. In summary, the empirical model suggests that
women are overall more tolerant of marital conflict than are men.
Table 4 shows effects of the location-specific variables on spousal payoffs
in the state of divorce. Recall that the spousal utilities in this state are
modeled using, among other variables, an availability ratio that is specific
to the sex of the spouse and interactions between the CSE collection rate
and the spouse’s education (education is used as a proxy for wealth after
divorce). I estimate sizable utility premia associated with the one’s opti-
mism regarding divorce prospects, and the utility premiumeffect appears to
be larger in the husband’s case. In addition, the estimates indicate that more
favorable marriage market conditions (i.e., a higher availability ratio) in-
crease the payoff from divorce for women. In contrast, the impact of the
Table 4
Utility Parameters in State of Divorce
Husband Wife
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Optimist’s premium 3.782** .380 .768** .139
Male-specific availability ratio .467 .401
Female-specific availability ratio 1.944** .529
1/2 year ≤ separation ≤ 1 year −.109 .142 .044 .165
Separation > 1 year −.242* .133 −.329** .130
Collection rate .293 1.107 1.486 1.201
Collection rate × high school, husbanda −1.851b 1.221
Collection rate × college, husbanda −.681 1.552
Collection rate × high school, wifea −1.999* 1.092
Collection rate × college, wifea −1.095 1.220
a Omitted education category is “no high school degree.”
b Effect of the collection rate on high-school-educated husbands is .293 + (−1.851) = −1.558 (p < .05).
* p < .10.
** p < .05.
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availability ratio on the husband’s utility is not statistically significant.
These differential effects may be due to a difference in the marginal impact
of partner availability for men and women. In particular, data summary
statistics suggest that men typically face more favorable marriage markets
than women (see table B3). Thus, a low estimated utility impact of the
availability ratio on the husband but a high impact on thewife should not be
surprising. In turn, the separation period requirements tend to decrease the
divorce payoffs. However, only the effects of long-term separation periods
(i.e., periods exceeding 1 year) are found to be statistically significant. This
result is consistent with long-term separation periods having larger mone-
tary, time, and psychological costs in the divorce process in comparison to
short-term periods and suggests that separation period requirements may
affect divorce decisions. In addition, the estimates indicate that the strength
of CSE at the state level may differentially affect spousal payoffs from
divorce (the impact of CSE is only relevant for couples with children).
Moreover, the impact of CSE appears to vary with education. In particular,
I detect a negative and statistically significant effect of stronger CSE on
husbands with a high school degree. However, no statistically significant
effects are found for husbands without a high school degree and with a
college degree. In comparison, the effects are not precisely estimated for
wives, which suggests that the impact of the strength of CSE on the wife’s
divorce payoff may be weak.
B. Spousal Types and Beliefs
Table 5 reports sample means of the type probabilities for both spouses
and samplemeans of simulated husband’s beliefs about the wife’s true type.
Almost three-fourths of husbands andmore than two-thirds of wives in the
sample are of the type soft bargainer–pessimist. In conjunction with the
utility estimates discussed earlier, these results indicate that a majority of
spouses derive a substantial disutility from conflict and have a low assess-
ment of their own hypothetical postdivorce opportunities, which contrib-
utes to the high observable rate of cooperation in marriage. The mean true
type probabilities for wives differ from the mean husbands’ beliefs. More
Table 5
Sample Means of Type Probabilities and Beliefs
True Typesa
Spousal Type Husband Wife Beliefs, Husbandb
HO (hard bargainer–optimist) .089 .039 .165
HP (hard bargainer–pessimist) .154 .212 .036
SO (soft bargainer–optimist) .016 .059 .130
SP (soft bargainer–pessimist) .741 .690 .669
a Sample mean estimated probability of a player type.
b Simulated sample mean probability that a husband assigns to the wife’s type.
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specifically, husbands on average tend to underestimate the prevalence of
the hard bargaining trait among their wives and overestimate the prevalence
of the wives’ optimism about the outside option. This result indicates the
information asymmetries between spouses that may lead to inefficient
outcomes.
C. Goodness-of-Fit Tests
To evaluate how well the estimated model fits the data, I perform a
battery of x2 goodness-of-fit tests (Bartoszyn´ski andNiewiadomska-Bugaj
1996, sec. 17.2). The battery includes (1) tests based on partitioning the
sample by combinations of the explanatory variables and (2) tests based on
partitioning by combinations of predicted marital state probabilities. Each
test involves splitting the sample into subsamples and then evaluating how
closely the predicted distribution of couples across the marital states
matches the actual distribution. The null hypothesis is that the distribu-
tions are not statistically different, which would indicate good model
performance.
In a typical test based on partitioning by combinations of the explanatory
variables, I split the sample into six groups of approximately equal size
(ensuring identical group sizes is difficult because many variables are
discretely measured). For example, the sample is first split into terciles by
the husband’s age (from the youngest to the oldest husband). Every such
tercile is then additionally split in half by marriage duration (from the
shortest to the longestmarriage). The resulting six groups comprise roughly
650 couples each. I compute the value of a goodness-of-fit test statistic in
each of these six groups and then sum the group statistics to compute a
sample goodness-of-fit test statistic for this particular partitioning.17 Table 6
presents the computed p-values in this example. They indicate that the
model is a good fit to the data. It should be noted that changing the order
of the variables (e.g., partitioning bymarriage duration first and then by the
husband’s age) may result in different groups and comprise a new test.
By following a similar procedure, I perform over a hundred different
goodness-of-fit tests, while employing all possible binary combinations of
the explanatory variables provided that the groups in a partitioning are
sufficiently large for the test to be informative.18 The p-values of the sample
statistics in the tests range from0.102 to 0.999. Thus, the null hypothesis of a
good in-sample fit of the model cannot be rejected at a conventional
significance level in any case.
17 Under the null hypothesis, a group statistic is distributed as a x2 random
variablewith twodegrees of freedom, and the sample statistic is distributed asx2(12).
18 The subsamples of couples with black husbands and with the wife’s own
children are already too small to be subdivided further.
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In every goodness-of-fit test based on partitioning by combinations of
predicted marital state probabilities, I split the sample into nine equally
sized groups according to probabilities of two states. For example, the
sample is first split into terciles by the predicted probability of cooperation
(from the lowest to the highest value). Every such tercile is then additionally
split into three equally sized subsets by the predicted probability of conflict
(again, from the lowest to the highest value). The procedure results in nine
groups comprising 431 couples each. Similar to the tests based on partition-
ing by combinations of the explanatory variables, I compute the group and
the sample goodness-of-fit test statistics. Table 7 presents a summary of the
tests, including the p-values of the sample statistics. The results indicate that
the hypothesis of a good in-sample fit cannot be rejected at a conventional
significance level in any case. In summary, all performed goodness-of-fit
tests indicate that the estimated model fits the data well.
D. Evidence on Out-of-Sample Performance
The NSFH wave 3 (2001–2) data are nonrandom because the survey
selectively dropped a large fraction of the original respondents in order to
save on interviewing costs. As such, these data are not employed in the
estimation but rather are used only to assess whether the model may
Table 6
Example of a Goodness-of-Fit Test Where Sample Is
Partitioned by Age and Duration
Second Split: Marriage Duration
First Split: Age, Husband’s Bottom Half Top Half
Tercile 1 .737 .786
Tercile 2 .116 .217
Tercile 3 .503 .294
NOTE.—p-values of x2 goodness-of-fit test statistics; p-value of sample statistic =
.423.
Table 7
Summary of Goodness-of-Fit Tests Where Sample Is
Partitioned by Combinations of State Probabilities
First Split Second Split p-valuea
…Pr [s = cooperation] …Pr [s = conflict] .488…Pr [s = cooperation] …Pr [s = divorce] .268…Pr [s = conflict] …Pr [s = cooperation] .357…Pr [s = conflict] …Pr [s = divorce] .309…Pr [s = divorce] …Pr [s = cooperation] .277…Pr [s = divorce] …Pr [s = conflict] .779
NOTE.—To perform the tests, the sample is partitioned as follows. First, it is split
into terciles by values of the predicted marital state probability (first split). Second,
each resulting tercile is further split into three subsets by the predicted probabil-
ity (second split).…Pr ½   = predicted probability.
a p-value of the x2 goodness-of-fit sample statistic.
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perform reasonably out of sample. Given the data limitations, the evidence
presented below is only suggestive and should not be viewed as a definitive
test of the model’s validity.
Since the time lag between waves 2 and 3 is more than 50% longer than
between waves 1 and 2 (i.e., 8.5 vs. 5.5 years, respectively), it makes little
sense to use actual marital states from wave 3 in out-of-sample predictions.
Instead, I employ family history records to infer whether couples are still
intact 5.5 years after wave 2. A notable limitation of this approach is that I
amable to assess themodel’s out-of-sample performance only in terms of its
ability to predict the incidence of divorce. In total, I have information about
2,002 couples who were married as of wave 2 and did not experience the
death of a spouse afterward. The actual divorce rate among these couples 5.5
years afterwave 2 is 7.99%.Using the estimatedmodel parameters, I predict
a rate of 8.98%,which indicates that themodelmay overpredict divorce out
of sample. However, the relative magnitude of the overprediction is on the
order of 12%, which seems small.
E. Specification Tests
First, I investigate whether the divorce payoffsmight bemisspecified and
might need to incorporate additional explanatory variables. In the United
States, individual states have different legal regimes of property division
after divorce (Freed and Walker 1991). In particular, “community prop-
erty” states mandate an equal division of assets acquired during marriage
between the ex-spouses. In “common law” states, assets are split according
to who has legal title to them. In contrast, “equitable distribution” states
allow courts substantial discretion in allocating property. Research to date
suggests that the regime of property division after divorce might affect
divorce payoffs (Gray 1998; Stevenson 2007). To check whether the regime
might influence divorce utilities, I create indicators for the common law
and community property regimes using information on each couple’s state
of residence (equitable distribution is the base category), include these
indicators in the specification of the husband’s and wife’s divorce payoffs,
and then test whether the coefficients on the indicators are statistically
different from zero, using a Lagrange multiplier test (the null hypothesis is
that the coefficients are zero). The p-value of the test statistic is .595, which
indicates that the regime of property division has no statistically significant
effect and suggests that the divorce payoffs are not misspecified.
In addition, I test whether the strength of CSEmight differentially affect
couples with two ormore children, in comparison to couples with only one
child. More specifically, I create an indicator for couples with two or more
common children, include interactions of this indicator with the CSE
variable and the CSE variable interacted with the spousal education levels
in the divorce payoffs, and perform a Lagrange multiplier test to check
whether the corresponding coefficients are statistically different from zero.
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The p-value of the test statistic is .266, which indicates no differential effect
and again suggests that the divorce payoffs are not misspecified.
Second, as discussed in Section IV.C, marriage duration can affect beliefs
because marriages that have lasted longer are dynamically selected on the
basis of individual traits. In that case, the type probability functions in the
belief vector would be misspecified and should additionally incorporate
marriage duration.To investigatewhether coefficients onmarriage duration
in these functions are statistically different from zero, I perform a Lagrange
multiplier test (the null hypothesis is that the coefficients are zero). The p-
value of the test statistic is .464, which indicates that duration has no
statistically significant effect here and suggests that the estimated belief
functions are, in fact, not misspecified. It should be noted that the empirical
specification of the beliefs already incorporates all available relevant spousal
responses. Thus, the performed test simply indicates that marriage duration
has no statistically significant additional impact after controlling for the
responses.
F. Alternative Versions of the Model
To check the robustness of the baseline findings presented earlier, I
estimate two alternative versions of the model by varying the specification
of the cooperation and the conflict payoffs. In particular, the model is
reestimated while excluding marriage duration from the payoffs. In this
case, the magnitude of the estimated parameters changes slightly. For
instance, the husband’s age, which is correlated with the excluded marriage
duration, is now estimated to have a larger impact on the payoff from
cooperation. Also, there are some changes in terms of statistical significance
of the estimates. However, the results seem to change little qualitatively.
In addition, the model is reestimated while including in the payoffs
potentially endogenous variables such as the number of common children
and an indicator of home ownership.19 In this case, I find that children
tend to increase the joint utility from cooperation and the conflict payoffs
of both spouses, while home ownership tends to increase the husband’s
utility from conflict. However, I detect few qualitative differences from
the baseline results in terms of the effect of the other variables (i.e., the
variables in the baseline model) and only find small changes in the
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients on these variables
overall.
19 The estimatesmaybe inconsistent andmust be interpretedwith caution because
the added variables may be correlated with the unobservable payoff components.
For example, consider home ownership. It is conceivable that couples with a low
marital match may perceive divorce as a likely eventual outcome, and in order to
minimize future divorce costs, they may choose to rent rather than buy a house
(presumably, divorce will be less costly when there are fewer assets to split between
the ex-spouses). Likewise, fertility decisions in marriage may also be endogenous.
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G. Incidence of Inefficient Divorce
A notable feature of the modeling approach in this article is that it allows
me to quantify the incidence of inefficient divorces. Divorce is inefficient
(but need not occur) provided that the sum of the spousal payoffs from
divorce is less than the joint payoff from cooperation, ykh þ ylw <uh þ uw,
because in this case both the husband and the wife can potentially attain a
higher utility level by cooperating rather than by divorcing.20 Thus, to
calculate the probability that themarital outcome of a divorced couple with
characteristicsX is, in fact, inefficient, I need to compute the probability of
the event ykh þ ylw <uh þ uw conditional on divorce being the equilibrium
outcomeof the game; that is, Pr ½ ykh þ ylw <uh þ uwjs ¼ divorce;X;G. Using
standard probability rules and the fact that cooperation, conflict, and
divorce are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, this conditional probability
can be expressed as
Pr ½ ykh þ ylw <uh þ uwjs ¼ divorce;X;G
¼ ðPr ½s ¼ divorcejX;GÞ − 1Pr ½ ykh þ ylw <uh þ uw; s ¼ divorcejX;G
¼ ðPr ½s ¼ divorcejX;GÞ − 1∑
k;l
pkhp
l
wðPr ½ ykh þ ylw < uh þ uwjk; l; X;G
−Pr ½ ykh þ ylw < uh þ uw; s ¼ cooperationjk; l;X;G
−Pr ½ ykh þ ylw < uh þ uw; s ¼ conflictjk; l;X;GÞ:
To calculate the components of the conditional probability formula (5), I
apply techniques that are analogous to the ones outlined in Section IV.E and
appendix C.
By using the estimated model parameters and evaluating formula (5) on
observable data for the couples, I find that the model predicts the frequency
of the inefficiency given the divorce outcome at 22.58% overall. This result
indicates a substantial incidence of inefficient marital outcomes, as implied
by the model.
H. Policy Experiments
It is difficult to imagine that government action can directly address the
root cause of inefficient marital outcomes in the model, namely, the pres-
ence of asymmetric information between the spouses. Instead, I consider
two types of public policies that have been subject to change in recent
decades and can affect spousal divorce prospects: separation period require-
ments and CSE. I investigate how changes in these policies can alter (1) the
overall incidence of marital conflict and divorce and (2) the incidence of the
20 For example, the husband’s utility under cooperation can potentially be uh ¼
ykh þ ðε=2Þ, and the wife’s utility can be uw ¼ ylw þ ðε=2Þ, where ε ¼ uh þ uw − ykh −
ylw > 0, given an appropriately specified transfer. In that case, uh > y
k
h and uw > y
l
w,
which indicates the inefficiency of divorce.
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inefficiency indivorce.Notably, I only consider effects of policy changes on
married couples and do not address potential effects on marital search and
match formation among single individuals.21 The experiments are con-
ducted using 100,000 randomly drawn (with replacement) couples from
the sample, and fractions of couples in eachmarital state are calculated using
the NSFH sample weights to be representative of the US population.
A few comments about the experiments are in order. Recall that the
model explicitly incorporates utility transfer offers to sustain cooperation,
and the marital outcome depends on whether the offer is accepted. The
magnitude of the offered transfer is, in part, determined by the divorce
payoffs, which are parameterized using the separation period requirements
and the strength of CSE. Thus, I quantify effects of policy changes while
accounting for the fact that the transfer offer can change in response to a
policy-induced change in the divorce payoffs. In effect, the policy experi-
ments analyzed here operate through the spousal bargaining channel. It is
worth noting that although similar policy simulations might be imple-
mented in the context of a reduced-form model, such a model would not
account for a possible change in the utility transfer offer, and moreover, it
would not allow me to quantify a possible change in the incidence of
inefficient divorces.
First, I analyze a hypothetical scenario inwhich all separation periods are
eliminated. The predicted distribution of marital states and the probability
of marital outcome inefficiency conditional on divorce under this scenario
are reported as experiment A in table 8 and can be compared to the baseline
case there. According to the results, eliminating separation requirements
appears to be a deterrent to marital conflict. In particular, the incidence of
conflict falls by 0.94 percentage points (from 10.27% to 9.33%), or 9.2% of
the baseline level of the conflict frequency. Also, elimination of separation
periods leads to a higher incidence of divorce. Specifically, the fraction of
21 For an example of theoretical analysis of a potential impact on single individ-
uals, I refer interested readers to Rasul (2006).
Table 8
Results of Policy Experiments
Marital State Baseline Experiment A Experiment B
Cooperation (%) 78.65 79.15 81.28
Conflict (%) 10.27 9.33 9.99
Divorce (%) 11.08 11.52 8.73
Total (%) 100.00 100.00 100.00
Pr ½inefficiencyjdivorce .2258 .2314 .1608
NOTE.—Distributions are calculated using the National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH)
sample weights. In experiment A, all separation periods are eliminated. In experiment B, the child support
enforcement collection rate is increased to 100%.
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divorced couples rises by 0.44 percentage points, or 4.0% of the baseline
rate. This finding is intuitive because eliminating separationperiods tends to
increase spousal divorce utilities (see table 4). In addition, the results
indicate that relatively more divorces are inefficient under this scenario
since the conditional probability of the inefficiency given divorce is higher
overall than in the baseline case (i.e., 0:2314 > 0:2258). Thus, on the one
hand, eliminating separation requirements increases the incidence of effi-
cient marital outcomes by reducing the frequency of conflict (conflict is
always inefficient). However, on the other hand, the effect is partly offset
because of the increased frequency of inefficient divorce.
Second, I consider a hypothetical scenario of a perfect enforcement of
child support payments, inwhich case theCSEcollection rate is set at 100%.
The results of the policy experiment are reported as experiment B in table 8.
Notably, stronger CSE decreases both the incidence of marital conflict and
the incidence of divorce, relative to the baseline case. Specifically, the
fraction of couples in conflict falls by 0.28 percentage points, or 2.7% of
the baseline level. In turn, the fraction of couples in divorce declines by 2.35
percentage points, or 21.2% of the baseline rate. In addition, the results
indicate that relatively fewer divorces are inefficient under this scenario
since the conditional probability of the inefficiency given divorce is lower
overall than in the baseline case (i.e., 0:1608 < 0:2258). Therefore, stronger
CSE unambiguously increases the incidence of efficient marital outcomes
by reducing the frequency of conflicts and the frequency of inefficient
divorces.
VI. Conclusion
In this article, I propose and estimate a structural model of spousal in-
teractions to explorewhy some couples have intense disputes but keep living
together, while other couples cooperate, and the rest divorce. The model
enables a quantificationof the incidence of inefficientdivorces andallowsme
to assess the difference in male and female preferences for marital conflict.
This article has several novel features that distinguish it fromother papers
onmarriage in the family economics literature. First, conflict is treated as an
equilibrium marital outcome, which is distinct from the outcomes of
cooperation and divorce. Second, spousal interactions are modeled using
a noncooperative game, which helps me to endogenize Pareto-inefficient
outcomes and incorporate asymmetric information. Third, I exploit rich-
ness of the NSFH data to construct an indicator of conflict that encom-
passes both the frequency and the intensity of spousal disputes. Fourth, I
assess how public policies related to separation period requirements and
enforcement of child support obligations can affect the distribution of
marital outcomes and the incidence of inefficient divorces.
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The estimation results appear to be intuitive. For instance, the difference
between spousal education levels has a negative effect on utility from
cooperation, while marriage duration has a positive effect. More favorable
conditions in the local marriage market tend to increase the wife’s divorce
payoff, while mandatory separation periods tend to decrease the spousal
payoffs, especially in the case of long-term periods. In addition, the esti-
mates imply that a large majority of spouses are less able to tolerate conflict
and think that their outside options are low. Also, the results suggest that
women are overall more tolerant of marital conflict than are men and
indicate a substantial incidence of inefficient divorces.
In policy experiments, I find that eliminating separationperiods can serve
as a deterrent to conflict but can also increase the divorce rate, as well as the
incidence of the inefficiency in divorce. In turn, strong CSE can decrease
the frequency of both conflict and divorce and reduce the incidence of the
inefficiency. These results suggest that improving CSE may facilitate effi-
cient marital outcomes.
I conclude by pointing out two directions for future research. First, the
available data onmarital conflict seem to includemore information than can
be fully described by only two states of an intact marriage (i.e., cooperation
and conflict) since spousesmay report disputes over several distinct areas of
the relationship. It may be interesting to investigate whether multi-issue
bargaining models (e.g., Lang and Rosenthal 2001; Busch and Horstmann
2002) could be extended to address the multidimensionality of family
negotiations. Second, due to data limitations, I estimated a static model of
spousal interactions. Asmore data are collected, a dynamicmodel should be
developed to explore the evolution of negotiation strategies and private
information inmarriage, aswell as possible interdependence betweenmatch
formation and spousal bargaining.
Appendix A
Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1
To start with, note that for any l,
1
ylw > v
l
w
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
þ 1 v
l
w ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
þ 1 uwðtÞ ≥ y
l
w
uwðtÞ ≥ vlw
 
¼ 1;
1ðylw > vlwÞ þ 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ ¼ 1:
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Then, for convenience, rewrite EˆVkhðt; CÞ and EˆVkhðRÞ as
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼ ykh∑
l
dl1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
þ vkh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
þ uhð− tÞ∑
l
dl1
uwðtÞ ≥ ylw
uwðtÞ ≥ vlw
 
;
EˆVkhðRÞ ¼ ykh þ ðvkh − ykhÞ∑
l
dl1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ:
Irrespective of t, there are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibil-
ities: either vkh < y
k
h or v
k
h ≥ y
k
h.
Consider arbitrary t such that uhð− tÞ < ykh. Suppose it is the case that
vkh < y
k
h. Then,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ≤ ykh∑
l
dl1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
þ ykh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
þ ykh∑
l
dl1
uwðtÞ ≥ ylw
uwðtÞ ≥ vlw
 
¼ ykh ≡ EˆVkhðDÞ ≤max fEˆVkhðRÞ; EˆVkhðDÞg:
Next, suppose it is the case that vkh ≥ y
k
h. Then,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ≤ vkh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
þ ykh∑
l
dl 1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
þ 1 uwðtÞ ≥ y
l
w
uwðtÞ ≥ vlw
  
¼ ykh þ ½vkh − ykh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
:
By properties of indicator functions,
1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
≤ 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ:
It follows that
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ≤ ykh þ ½vkh − ykh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
≤ ykh þ ðvkh −ykhÞ∑
l
dl1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ ¼EˆVkhðRÞ
≤ max fEˆVkhðRÞ; EˆVkhðDÞg:
QED
Further proofs can be facilitated by three lemmas that are based on
properties of semicontinuous functions (see Rudin 1987; Jost 2003).
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LEMMA 1. For any l, functions
1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
and 1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
are lower semicontinuous in t.
Proof. The functions can be expressed as
1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
¼ 1ðylw > vlwÞ 1ðylw > uwðtÞÞ;
1
vlw ≥ vlw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
¼ 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ 1ðvlw > uwðtÞÞ:
By continuity of uwðtÞ in t, inequalities ylw > uwðtÞ and vlw > uwðtÞ define
open sets. Then, 1ð ylw > uwðtÞÞ and 1ðvlw > uwðtÞÞ are lower semicontinuous
as indicator functions of open sets.
With respect to t, 1ðylw > vlwÞ and 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ are nonnegative constants.
Therefore, products 1ðylw > vlwÞ 1ðylw > uwðtÞÞ and 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ 1ðvlw >
uwðtÞÞ are lower semicontinuous. QED
LEMMA 2. For any k, function
f ðtÞ ¼ ½vkh −uhð− tÞ∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
is upper semicontinuous in t.
Proof. Recall that there exists t0 such that
uhð− t0Þ > vHh ≥ vkh; for any k;
and
uwðt0Þ > vHw ≥ vlw; for any l:
Consider arbitrary t ≥ t0. Since uwðtÞ increases in t, it is the case that uwðtÞ
> uwðt0Þ > vHw ≥ vlw. Therefore,
1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
¼ 0
for any l, and f ðtÞ ¼ 0. Then, f ðtÞ is trivially continuous and, thus, upper
semicontinuous.
Next, consider arbitrary t < t0. Since uhð− tÞ decreases in t, it is the case
that uhð− tÞ > uhð− t0Þ > vHh ≥ vkh. Since uhð− tÞ is also continuous in t, it
follows that for any k, uhð− tÞ−vkh is positive, continuous, and, thus, lower
semicontinuous.
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Since dl ≥ 0, lemma 1 implies that
∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
is a nonnegative lower semicontinuous function in t. Then,
− f ðtÞ ¼ ½uhð− tÞ−vkh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
is lower semicontinuous for t < t0 as the product of two nonnegative lower
semicontinuous functions. Then, function f ðtÞ is upper semicontinuous for
t < t0. It follows that f ðtÞ is upper semicontinuous for all t. QED
LEMMA 3. For any k, function
f ðtÞ ¼ ½ ykh −uhð− tÞ∑
l
dl1
ylw > v
l
w
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
is upper semicontinuous on Tk.
Proof. Since dl ≥ 0, lemma 1 implies that
∑
l
dl1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
is a nonnegative lower semicontinuous function in t. Recall that for all
t ∈Tk, uhð− tÞ ≥ ykh. Thus, function uhð− tÞ− ykh is nonnegative on Tk. It is
also continuous and, thus, lower semicontinuous.
Then, the product of two nonnegative lower semicontinuous functions,
− f ðtÞ ¼ ½uhð− tÞ− ykh∑
l
dl1
ylw > v
l
w
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
;
is lower semicontinuous for all t ∈Tk. It follows that f ðtÞ is upper semi-
continuous on Tk. QED
Proof of Theorem 2
It is straightforward to express function EˆVkhðt; CÞ as
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼ uhð− tÞ þ ½vkh −uhð− tÞ∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtÞ
 
þ ½ykh −uhð− tÞ∑
l
dl1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtÞ
 
:
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The first summand is continuous and, thus, upper semicontinuous for all t.
The second summand is upper semicontinuous for all t by lemma 2. The
third summand is upper semicontinuous on Tk by lemma 3. Hence,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ is upper semicontinuous on Tk as a finite sum of upper semicon-
tinuous functions. QED
Proof of Theorem 3
Part 1
Observe that ifTk is empty, its complement coincideswith set ½tmin; tmax .
Now, recall that there exists t0 ∈ ½tmin; tmax  such that ykh > uhð− t0Þ > vHh ≥
vkh. Then,
EˆVkhðDÞ ≡ ykh ¼ ykh∑
l
dl1ðylw > vlwÞ þ ykh∑
l
dl1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ
≥ ykh∑
l
dl1ðylw > vlwÞ þ vkh∑
l
dl1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ ¼ EˆVkhðRÞ:
Part 2
Consider transfer tmin. For any l it is the case that vlw ≥ vsw > uwðtminÞ and,
therefore,
1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtminÞ
 
¼ 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ
and
1
uwðtminÞ ≥ ylw
uwðtminÞ ≥ vlw
 
¼ 0:
Since
1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtminÞ
 
þ 1 v
l
w ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtminÞ
 
þ 1 uwðtminÞ ≥ y
l
w
uwðtminÞ ≥ vlw
 
¼ 1;
then
1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtminÞ
 
¼ 1− 1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ:
It follows that
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EˆVkhðtmin; CÞ ¼ ykh∑
l
dl1
ylw > vlw
ylw > uwðtminÞ
 
þ vkh∑
l
dl1
vlw ≥ ylw
vlw > uwðtminÞ
 
þ uhð− tminÞ∑
l
dl1
uwðtminÞ ≥ ylw
uwðtminÞ ≥ vlw
 
¼ ykh þ ½vkh − ykh∑
l
dl1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ
¼ ykh∑
l
dl1ðylw > vlwÞ þ vkh∑
l
dl1ðvlw ≥ ylwÞ ¼ EˆVkhðRÞ:
By monotonicity of uhðÞ, tmin ∈Tk. Then, maxt ∈ TkEˆVkhðt; CÞ ≥ EˆVkhðtmin; CÞ
¼ EˆVkhðRÞ. QED
Proof of Theorem 4
The wife’s best response function to a transfer offer tmaps the offer into
the set of wife’s actions—(1) accept the offer, (2) reject the offer without
separating, or (3) divorce—and is explicitly described in Section III.B for an
arbitrary wife’s type l. Now, consider the optimal strategic choice for
arbitrary husband’s type k. If set Tk is empty, theorems 1 and 3 imply that
D is the (weakly) dominant strategy of the husband. In this case, an
equilibrium can be specified as the husband’s strategyD and the wife’s best
response function (should the game ever reach an information set where the
wife needs to move).
If set Tk is nonempty, theorem 2 implies that function EˆVkhðt; CÞ attains
itsmaximumonTk, and, therefore, I can define t* ¼ arg max t ∈ TkEˆVkhðt; CÞ.
Then, the optimal strategic choice amounts to comparing two real numbers,
EˆVkhðDÞ and EˆVkhðt*; CÞ. If the former number dominates, an equilibrium is
identical to the one outlined in the previous paragraph. Otherwise, an
equilibrium comprises the husband’s strategy ðt*; CÞ and the wife’s best
response function. QED
Proof of Theorem 5
Since the alternativemodel is a special case of the originalmodel, the state
of conflict occurs when the husband proposes cooperation and the wife
rejects the offer but abstains from separating. I show that each of the three
conditions precludes this outcome.
Condition 1. If ylw > vw for all l, then announcing divorce is always a
better option for the wife than rejecting the offer without separating.
Condition 2. Obviously, the inequality ylw > vw for all l is either true
or false. If it is true, then conflicts for all dp > 0 are ruled out by
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condition 1. Alternatively, suppose that ylw > vw for all l is false or,
equivalently, that vw ≥ yPw.
Observe that if condition 2 holds,
∑
l
dl1ðvw ≥ ylwÞ ¼ dO1ðvw ≥ yOwÞ þ dP1ðvw ≥ yPwÞ
¼ dO1ðvw ≥ yOwÞ þ dP ≥ dP > 0:
Recall that there exists transfer t0 such that uhð− t0Þ > vh and uwðt0Þ > vw.
Now, since vw > uwðtminÞ and uwðtÞ is continuous in t, by the intermediate
value theorem (Jost 2003, theorem 1.14), there exists transfer tˆ such that
uwðtˆÞ ¼ vw. Moreover, because uwðtÞ increases in t, it must be that t0 > tˆ
and, in turn, uhð− tˆÞ > uhð− t0Þ > vh.
There are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities: either
tˆ ∈Tk or tˆ ∉ Tk. First, consider the case tˆ ∈ Tk. I show that the husband
would offer such transfer t* that the wife would not incite a conflict:
uwðt*Þ ≥ vw, or, equivalently, t* ≥ tˆ.
It is straightforward to verify that
EˆVkhðtˆ; CÞ ¼ ykh∑
l
dl1ðylw > vwÞ þ uhð− tˆÞ∑
l
dl1ðvw ≥ ylwÞ ≥ ykh:
Hence, maxt ∈ TkEˆVkhðt; CÞ ≥ EˆVkhðtˆ; CÞ ≥ ykh, and the husband would be at
least as well off by making an offer as by announcing divorce.
Clearly, subset ½tmin; tˆ ⊂ Tk, and it is easy to show that for any t ∈ ½tmin; tˆ,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼ ykh∑
l
dl1ðylw > vwÞ þ vh∑
l
dl1ðvw ≥ ylwÞ:
Then, since vh <uhð− tˆÞ and ∑ ld′1ðvw ≥ ylwÞ > 0, it must be that for all
t ∈ ½tmin; tˆ,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ < EˆVkhðtˆ; CÞ ≤ max
t ∈ Tk
EˆVkhðt; CÞ;
and therefore, t* ≥ tˆ, as desired.
Second, consider the case tˆ ∉ Tk. I show that the husband optimally
chooses to divorce. Clearly, uhð− tˆÞ < ykh, and, therefore, every t ∈Tk must
necessarily satisfy inequality t < tˆ. Then, for all t ∈ Tk,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼ ykh∑
l
dl1ðylw > vwÞ þ vh∑
l
dl1ðvw ≥ ylwÞ < ykh
because vh <uhð− tˆÞ < ykh, and ∑ 1d′1ðvw ≥ ylwÞ > 0.
Therefore, max t ∈ Tk EˆVkhðt; CÞ < EˆVkhðDÞ, and the husband is better off by
announcing divorce. Hence, irrespective of whether tˆ ∈ Tk or tˆ ∉ Tk, the
state of conflict cannot occur.
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Condition 3. If ylw ≤ vw for all l, function EˆVkhðt; CÞ takes a very
simple form:
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼ vh1ðvw > uwðtÞÞ þ uhð− tÞ1ðuwðtÞ ≥ vwÞ:
Consider again two mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities tˆ ∈ Tk
and tˆ ∉ Tk, where tˆ is defined in the proof for condition 2. First, suppose
that tˆ ∈ Tk. By definition of tˆ, uhð− tˆÞ > vh and uwðtˆÞ ¼ vw, and, therefore,
by monotonicity of uhðÞ and uwðÞ, function EˆVkhðt; CÞ jumps from vh to
uhð− tˆÞ at t ¼ tˆ and decreases afterward in t. Hence, maxt ∈ Tk EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼
EˆVkhðtˆ; CÞ ¼ uhð− tˆÞ ≥ ykh, and the husband chooses to offer transfer tˆ, which
is acceptable to the wife.
Second, suppose that tˆ ∉ Tk. As shown earlier, every t ∈Tk must satisfy
inequality t < tˆ. Then, for all t ∈Tk,
EˆVkhðt; CÞ ¼ vh < ykh
because vh < uhð− tˆÞ < ykh, and, therefore, the husband is better off by
announcing divorce. Hence, irrespective of whether tˆ ∈ Tk or tˆ ∉ Tk, the
state of conflict cannot occur. QED
Appendix B
Details on Data
Table B1
Opinions and Beliefs
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
Same happiness, husband .17 .38 0 1 H says his own overall happiness
would be the same after divorce
More happy, husband .06 .23 0 1 H says his own overall happiness
would be better or much
better after divorce
Worthy person, husband .38 .49 0 1 H strongly agrees he is person of
worth
Same happiness, wife .15 .36 0 1 W says her own overall happiness
would be the same after divorce
More happy, wife .07 .26 0 1 W says her own overall happiness
would be better or much better
after divorce
Worthy person, wife .42 .49 0 1 W strongly agrees she is person of
worth
Same happiness .19 .39 0 1 H believes w’s overall happiness
would be the same after divorce
More happy .08 .27 0 1 H believes w’s overall happiness
would be better or much better
after divorce
NOTE.—H = husband; w = wife.
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Table B2
Sociodemographic Characteristics
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
Age, husband’s 41.02 13.75 17 90 Age of h in years
Age, absolute difference 3.62 3.84 0 38 Absolute value of age difference
Black husband .09 .29 0 1 H is black
Catholic husband .23 .42 0 1 H is Roman Catholic
Religion, difference .33 .47 0 1 H and w report different affiliations
High school, husband .51 .50 0 1 Highest education of h is high school
College, husband .33 .47 0 1 Highest education of h is (at least)
college
High school, wifea .58 .49 0 1 Highest education of w is
high school
College, wifea .29 .45 0 1 Highest education of w is
(at least) college
Education, difference .38 .48 0 1 H and w report different attainments
Marriage duration 14.51 13.23 0 64 Duration of marriage in years
Children, wife’s .14 .47 0 5 Number of own children of w
NOTE.—H = husband; w = wife. A child is an individual who is 18 years old or younger.
a Wife’s education indicators are used to parameterize the wife’s divorce payoff.
Table B3
Location-Speciﬁc Variables
Variable Mean SD Min Max Description
Male-specific availability
ratio
1.25 .24 .56 2.43 Local marriage market availability
ratio specific to h
Female-specific availability
ratio
.84 .15 .22 1.45 Local marriage market availability
ratio specific to w
Separation ≥ 1/2 year and
≤ 1 year
.18 .39 0 1 H and w reside in state with
separation period between
6 monthsa and 1 year
Separation > 1 year .33 .47 0 1 H and w reside in state with
separation period that exceeds
1 year
Collection rateb .19 .06 .06 .35 Child support enforcement
collection rate interacted
with indicator for presence
of children
NOTE.—H = husband; w = wife.
a Six months is the minimum period across states with separation requirements.
b Statistics are for the subsample of couples with children.
Appendix C
Transformation Algorithm
To compute conditional probabilities (3) and (4) in Section IV.E, I need
to evaluate expectations of the corresponding indicator functions.22 I trans-
form the problem of evaluating the expectations by analytically solving for
boundaries of relevant regions of integration of the joint density of errors v
22 Note that the expectations involve seven-dimensional integrals since errors v
and h are 4 1 and 3 1 vectors, respectively.
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and h. In doing so, I directly exploit the structure of the model. The
analytical transformation algorithm consists of the following steps.
First, the domain of error v4 is partitioned into intervals. The interval
boundaries are chosen so that the expected-value function of the husband of
type k, EˆVkhðt; CÞ, has a simple closed-form expression on each interval.
Second, I study properties of EˆVkhðt; CÞ on every interval of v4. It turns
out that the expected-value function has discontinuities in t but is non-
increasing in t between adjacent discontinuity points. Thus, the optimal
transfer, t*, is always at one of the discontinuities.
Third, given a specific wife’s type l, I determinewhich transfers would be
accepted by her and which ones would be rejected without the divorce
announcement. Acceptable transfers would result in the state of coopera-
tion, and the unacceptable ones would lead to conflict.
Fourth, for every such transfer, I write out a system of inequalities
underlying the decision of the husband of type k to offer it, and then I
analytically solve the system for integration bounds. In the solution, the
errors are systematically arranged in an order that is convenient for further
simulation. The steps are repeated for all intervals of v4 and all possible
spousal types k and l.
Effectively, the algorithm transforms the problem of evaluating the
expectations in equations (3) and (4) into a problem of computing several
integrals of the form
∫R3 ∫
f 2ðhÞ
f 1ðhÞ ∫
f 4ðv4;hÞ
f 3ðv4;hÞ ∫
f 6ðv3;v4;hÞ
f 5ðv3;v4;hÞ ∫
f 8ðv2;v3;v4;hÞ
f 7ðv2;v3;v4;hÞ
wðv; hÞdv1dv2dv3dv4dh;
wherewðÞ is the densityof the errors, and functions f 1ðÞ, f 2ðÞ, . . . , f 8ðÞ
are the integration bounds. Given the structure of the integrals, it is
straightforward to simulate them with the GHK method. Further details
on the algorithmand closed-form solutions for all integrationbounds canbe
found in Zhylyevskyy (2008).
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